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THE DECENTRALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW:
THE MISCHIEF OF § 287(g)
Marissa B. Litwin

I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

On September 4, 2007, Geraldo Carlos, a photographer for the
Newark, New Jersey newspaper the Brazilian Voice, discovered a dead
1
body in the Ironbound district of the city. After photographing the
body, he notified Roberto Lima, the editor of the publication, who
2
contacted the Newark Police Department. When Samuel Demaio,
Chief of the Newark Police Department, arrived at the scene of the
crime, he immediately questioned Carlos’s immigration status by
3
asking, “Are you legal,” and “Do you have a green card?” The police
chief’s questioning came less than one month after former New
Jersey Attorney General Anne Milgrim issued a Law Enforcement
Directive as to when and how state, county, and local police officers
4
should question individuals on their immigration status.
The

∗
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., cum laude,
2003, Connecticut College. Immense thanks are due to Professor Bryan Lonegan
and Brian Devito, without whom the completion of this work could not have been
possible. I dedicate this Comment in loving memory of Aura.
1
Brian Donahue, ‘Are You Legal?’ Is Bringing Fear to Immigrants, THE STAR LEDGER,
Sept. 18, 2007, at 1.
2
Complaint at 4–5, Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t., No. 08-0426 (D.N.J. Jan. 23,
2008).
3
Id. at 5.
4
ATTORNEY GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DIRECTIVE, NO. 2007-3 (2007),
available at http://www.state.nj.us/oag/dcj/agguide/directives/dir-le_dir-2007-3.pdf
[hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTIVE]. Milgrim issued the directive soon after
three college students were murdered in Newark; one of the suspected murderers
was an illegal immigrant at the time the killings occurred. Morning Edition: Newark
Fights to Reclaim Bloodied Streets (NPR radio broadcast Sept. 3, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14136210.
The directive
also reinforced a 2005 directive of the New Jersey Attorney General that renounced
racial profiling and racially-influenced policing, and declared that “using race or
ethnicity as a basis for initiating an investigation” is against State policy. ATTORNEY
GENERAL DIRECTIVE, supra note 4. Milgrim’s directive instructs officers, when making
an arrest for an indictable crime or for driving while intoxicated, to inquire about
the arrestee’s citizenship, nationality, and immigration status. Id. If officers have

399
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directive stated that “[s]tate, county, and local law enforcement
agencies necessarily and appropriately should inquire about a
person’s immigration status . . . after an individual has been arrested
5
for a serious violation of State criminal law.”
The directive
mandated, however, that only suspects of crimes—and specifically not
6
witnesses—should be so questioned.
Demaio’s behavior clearly
violated the Attorney General’s directive, and thus gave rise to Lima v.
7
Newark Police Department. Lima brought a civil rights suit against the
Department, which alleged violations of both the U.S. Constitution
and the New Jersey Constitution, and included Demaio as a named
8
defendant. Separately, Milgrim found that Demaio had indeed
violated the Directive and ordered the Newark Police Department to
9
discipline him appropriately.
Milgrim’s mandate and the Lima case are illustrative of a larger
national trend toward—and the problems that arise from—placing
enforcement of immigration law in the hands of state and local
10
agencies. Historically, immigration enforcement was the exclusive
11
domain of the federal government. In the past several decades,
however, Congress has decentralized enforcement and recruited state
12
and private actors into the immigration-enforcement scheme. But
as the Lima case illustrates, a decentralized system has proven
problematic. Local law-enforcement agencies are ill equipped to
investigate immigration violations and run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment in so doing. Furthermore, localized immigration
enforcement jeopardizes the ability of state and local agencies to
effectively police.
Perhaps the most controversial piece of federal legislation that
gives immigration law-enforcement authority to state and local

reason to believe that the arrestee is in the country unlawfully, the directive instructs
them to notify Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Id.
5
ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTIVE, supra note 4.
6
Id.
7
See Complaint, Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t., No. 08-0426 (D.N.J. Jan. 23,
2008).
8
Id. at 9–12.
9
Id. at 6.
10
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-109, REPORT TO CONG.
REQUESTERS, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT: BETTER CONTROLS NEEDED OVER PROGRAM
AUTHORIZING STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAWS (2009)
[hereinafter GAO-09-109].
11
See Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 274 (1876).
12
See GAO-09-109, supra note 10.
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agencies is § 287(g) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
Passed into law in 1996, § 287(g) grants immigration-enforcement
14
power to state and local law enforcement.
This Comment argues against § 287(g) and a decentralized
immigration law-enforcement system because they increase incidents
of egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be
15
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.
Generally, the
exclusionary rule precludes evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment from use in criminal proceedings against the
16
party whose rights the government violated. But the exclusionary
17
rule does not apply in immigration hearings unless law enforcement
seized the evidence in such an egregious manner that it transgresses
fundamental fairness and “undermine[s] the probative value of the
18
evidence obtained”—a very high burden.
Part II of this Comment outlines the history of immigration law
in the U.S. leading up to the implementation of § 287(g). Part III
discusses previous instances of decentralized immigration
enforcement, explores the damage such systems cause, and
highlights, in particular, employer sanctions and non-federal
immigrant-detention facilities. Part IV elaborates on the subsequent
mischief of § 287(g) and the unconstitutionality of a decentralized
immigration system. Part V urges Congress to repeal § 287(g)—or to
heavily restrict its ambit—and to re-centralize the enforcement of
immigration law.
II. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF IMMIGRATION LAW IN THE U.S.
Henderson v. Mayor of New York declared that the federal
19
government has exclusive power over immigration. In Henderson,
the plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a New York statute
that required vessel owners to pay tax for transporting foreign
20
passengers into New York.
The plaintiff argued that the statute
interfered with Congress’s power to regulate commerce with foreign

13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See generally INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
Id.
Id. at 1050–51.
92 U.S. 259 (1876).
Id. at 267.
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21

nations. The Supreme Court agreed and held that immigration
control had been “confided to Congress by the Constitution; that
Congress [could] more appropriately and with more acceptance
22
exercise it than any other body known to our law.” The Court stated
that the New York law was invalid because it regulated a field over
which Congress had exclusive control—the right to regulate
23
commerce with foreign nations. Along with its companion case, Chy
24
Lung v. Freeman, Henderson firmly established the “exclusive
25
character of federal power over immigration” and gave way to
enormous growth of federal immigration regulation. Until recently,
26
the federal government maintained exclusive control.
In 1996, Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and
27
28
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), which amended the INA
in various respects. One particular IIRAIRA provision—commonly
known as § 287(g)—enabled “the Attorney General [to] enter into a
written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State”
29
to perform immigration-law enforcement functions.
States and
localities could thus become participating § 287(g) agencies by
entering into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the supervising
agency of § 287(g) programs and a subdivision of the Department of
30
Justice (DOJ). In an effort to combat immigration challenges in
21

Id. at 270.
Id. at 274.
23
Id. at 270.
24
92 U.S. 275 (1876).
25
Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776–1875),
93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1886–87 (1993).
26
See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
27
See id.
28
The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (also called The McCarranWalter Act) came as a byproduct of the Cold War mentality in the U.S. after World
War II. The McCarran-Walter Act: A Contradictory Legacy on Race, Quotas, and Ideology,
POLICY
CTR.,
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/specialIMMIGRATION
reports/mccarran-walter-ada-contradictory-legacy-race-quotas-and-idealogy
(last
visited Feb. 12, 2010). It was a bill of nearly 300 pages that proposed new quota laws,
ending discrimination in immigration law (namely race and sex discrimination),
reinforcing deportation procedures, and various other immigration and
naturalization provisions. EDWARD PRINCE HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 1798–1965, 303 (Univ. of Pa. Press 1981).
29
§ 1357(g).
30
See § 1357(g)(1). ICE, the largest investigative agency in the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), came into existence in 2003. About U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010). Its mission is to
22
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local communities, both ICE and local law-enforcement agencies
31
assumed that they could benefit from the program.
The legislative intent behind § 287(g) was to amend the INA
and give state and local law-enforcement agencies the authority to
32
enforce criminal-immigration laws, not civil regulations. Unlawful
presence in the country is a civil-immigration violation, whereas
unlawful entry, aiding an immigrant with unlawful entry into the
country, and employing an illegal immigrant are all criminal
33
violations.
Congress specifically sought to prevent local lawenforcement officers from making arrests solely on the basis of
34
suspected deportability under their § 287(g) authority.
Section 287(g) gives state and local law-enforcement agencies
the ability to enter into agreements with the DOJ so that they have
the authority to enforce immigration law against criminal immigrants
35
who are already subject to a deportation order.
As of 2009,
approximately twelve million illegal immigrants were present in the
U.S., but the number of those who commit crimes remains
36
unknown. Thus, ICE sought to enlist states and localities to aid in
criminal investigations of violent crimes, human trafficking, gang
activity, organized crime, sexual offenses, drug-related offenses, and
37
money laundering. ICE explicitly indicated that the program was
not meant to give state and local agencies the authority to perform
protect homeland security by enforcing federal immigration and customs laws. Id. It
has over 400 offices worldwide. Id.
31
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/287g/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2010).
32
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., OIG-10-63, THE
PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS 2, 8 (2010) [hereinafter OIG-10-63].
33
See DAVID CARLINER, LUCAS GUTTENTAG, ARTHUR C. HELTON & WADE J.
HENDERSON, THE RIGHTS OF ALIENS AND REFUGEES: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO ALIEN
AND REFUGEE RIGHTS 165–66 (Norman Dorsen ed., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1990) (1977)
[hereinafter CARLINER et al.].
34
April McKenzie, A Nation of Immigrants or a Nation of Suspects? State and Local
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Since 9/11, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1149, 1152 (2004)
(citing Assistance by State and Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, Op.
O.L.C., II.B. (1996), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/immstopola.htm).
35
142 CONG. REC. H2475-01 (1996) (statement of Rep. Latham).
36
Immigration Enforcement: Controls over Program Authorizing State and Local
Enforcement of Federal Immigration Laws Should Be Strengthened: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Richard M. Stana,
Homeland Sec. and Justice, U.S. Gov’t. Accountability Office) [hereinafter Stana].
37
Examining 287(g): The Role of State and Local Law Enforcement in Immigration Law:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of
Muzaffar A. Chishti, Director, Migration Policy Institute’s Office at New York
University School of Law) [hereinafter Chishti].
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“random street operations” by targeting excessive-occupancy
38
dwellings or day-laborer activities.
Salt Lake City, Utah nearly initiated a § 287(g) program in 1998
39
because of a shortage of federal immigration officers in the area.
The sole purpose of the Salt Lake City agreement would have been to
give local law-enforcement officers “the authority to assist the INS in
transporting [aliens] across state lines to an INS holding facility in
Denver or Las Vegas . . . [not to] cross-deputiz[e local officers] so
40
they can enforce the INS laws.” The city council abandoned the
agreement, however, because of pervasive concerns of racial
41
profiling. Despite then-Police Chief Ruben Ortega’s insistence that
Latinos would not be targeted by the program and his claim that
eighty percent of felony-drug arrests were illegal immigrants, the city
42
council refused to implement the § 287(g) program.
Salt Lake
City’s resistance to the program was an early indication of national
concerns that would later surface.
After the September 11 attacks, the legislation began to take
43
shape as a tool to fight terrorism and protect public safety. Florida
44
Under the agreement,
signed the first § 287(g) MOA in 2002.
trained officers became members of Regional Domestic Security Task
45
Forces, a coalition created to combat terrorism. ICE officials still
maintained that § 287(g) programs were meant to target criminal
organizations and individuals who threatened border security but
46
“not the landscape architect that had the broken headlight.” ICE
officials additionally emphasized the significance of maintaining “a
47
very focused approach.”
In 2003, Alabama was the next state to enter into an MOA to
improve problems of fraudulent documentation use for procurement

38

Id.
Shawn Foster, SLC Council Says No to Cross-Deputization; Members Vote 4–3 Against
Agreement that Would Let 20 City Police Officers Enforce Immigration Law; Council Votes
Against Cross-Deputization, SALT LAKE CITY TRIB., Sept. 2, 1998, at C1.
40
Problems Related to Criminal Aliens in the State of Utah: Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims, 105th Cong. 14–15 (1998) (statement
of Aaron Kennard, Salt Lake County Sherriff).
41
See Foster, supra note 39.
42
Id.
43
Chishti, supra note 37, at 2.
44
Id. at 3.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
39
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48

of drivers’ licenses. While Alabama’s use of the § 287(g) program
reflected a desire to combat criminal behavior, this mission was not
within the initial purposes of the program—to apprehend illegal
49
immigrants who posed grave threats to national safety.
As of March 2009, sixty-seven local governments had entered
50
Consequently, § 287(g) is taking on the
into MOAs with ICE.
character of a general immigration-enforcement tool used to target
not only criminal aliens, but as many unlawfully present immigrants
51
as possible.
Yet Congress’s purpose in enacting the § 287(g)
program was to apprehend more easily illegal immigrants who had
52
committed serious crimes or posed a grave threat to public safety.
Some agencies operating in such a broadened manner have justified
their actions on the grounds that unlawfully present immigrants are
53
“more likely to commit crimes.” Furthermore, although ICE reports
indicate that state and local police forces participating in § 287(g)
have made 79,000 arrests on suspicion of violations of immigration
law, the percentage of those arrested who were actually found to pose
54
a threat to national security or public safety remains unknown. As
of March 4, 2009, ICE had released only the raw number of arrests
55
made. Additionally, throughout the first two years of the Florida
and Alabama MOAs, enforcement agencies made approximately five
56
and ten arrests per month, respectively. In contrast, both Florida
and Alabama § 287(g) arrests have risen to approximately 100 per
month in the last three years, indicating “a shift in emphasis from
57
high-priority targets to volume of arrests.”

48

Id.
See Chishti, supra note 37, at 7.
50
Stana, supra note 36, at 1.
51
See Chishti, supra note 37, at 4.
52
OIG-10-63, supra note 32, at 8.
53
Contra Ana Gorman, Crime Rates Higher for Deportees, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2008 at
A2, available at www.article.latimes.com/2008/sep/08/local/me-jail8 (stating that
illegal immigrants who have been deported at least once from the U.S. are more
likely to commit crimes than other immigrants, but illegal immigrants overall are not
a greater crime risk).
54
Chishti, supra note 37, at 5.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
49
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III. THE DAMAGES OF A DECENTRALIZED IMMIGRATION SYSTEM
A. The IRCA Legislation of 1986
Until recently, state exclusion from immigration law
58
enforcement remained unchallenged. Section 287(g) demonstrates
a departure from federal exclusivity, but it was not the first program
to override that precedent. Ten years earlier, Congress enacted the
59
Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA).
This legislation
granted amnesty and a path toward legalization for millions of
60
undocumented immigrants. To obtain support for the legislation,
however, the drafters of the IRCA agreed to toughen immigration61
In particular, the IRCA created an
enforcement standards.
employer-verification program that required employers to verify the
62
legality of their employees’ immigration status.
The statute
prohibits employers from “knowingly [hiring] for employment at
least 10 individuals with actual knowledge that the individuals are
63
aliens.”
Further, employers risk sanctions or imprisonment for
64
failing to follow this law. Thus, the IRCA charged private actors with
enforcing federal immigration law by assigning employers an
obligation to verify the immigration status of their employees
through mandatory Employment Eligibility Verification Forms for all
employees, which federal immigration and labor agencies became
65
authorized to review.
Although the IRCA’s mission was to stop illegal immigrant labor,
the Act produced perverse consequences. Specifically, immigrant
66
67
exploitation and employment discrimination surged.
Despite
national policy to discourage employers from hiring illegal
immigrants, the IRCA instead fostered a “silent compact” between
58

Neuman, supra note 25, at 1886, 1892; see supra Part II.
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2006).
60
See id. § 1255a.
61
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigration Law and Policy: Prohibiting the Employment of
Unauthorized Immigrants: The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 196 (2007).
62
See § 1324.
63
§ 1324(3)(A).
64
Id.
65
Id.; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-90-62, REPORT TO CONG.
REQUESTERS, IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF
DISCRIMINATION 2 (1990) [hereinafter GAO/GGD-90-62], available at
http://www.gao.gov/docdblite/summary.php?rptno=GGD-90-62.
66
Janice Fine, Worker Centers: Organizing Communities at the Edge of the Dream, 50
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 417, 417 (2005).
67
GAO/GGD-90-62, supra note 65, at 2.
59
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employers and illegal employees: “in exchange for corporate
indifference to their exact legal status, workers [did] not make a fuss
68
about conditions or compensation.”
Furthermore, the IRCA
deterred immigrants from reporting unlawful activity—as both
69
witnesses and victims—to labor and employment agencies. Such
exploitation not only impacted undocumented immigrant workers,
but also their families (who may or may not be undocumented), their
coworkers, the general work environment, and the community-at70
large. The IRCA demonstrates that a decentralized immigration
system causes damage when control mechanisms depart from the
federal level.
B. Immigrant Detention
In the 1990s, immigrant detention became a growing trend in
71
response to rising undocumented immigration. One provision of
72
the IIRAIRA, enacted in 1996, called for mandatory detention of
73
noncitizens convicted of crimes. But the law’s reach became overinclusive; as a result of mandatory-detention laws, “[g]rowing
numbers of noncitizens, including legal immigrants, [were] held
74
unnecessarily and transferred [from facility to facility] heedlessly.”
In fact, only twenty-seven percent of immigrant detainees between
75
October 2008 and September 2009 had a criminal record.
Moreover, only a small percentage of those who qualified as “criminal
aliens” had committed serious crimes, and the majority were
76
convicted of minor violations.
As a result of the surge in immigrant detention, the need for
77
detention facilities across the country rose significantly.
While

68

Fine, supra note 66, at 417.
Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667,
673–79 (2003).
70
Wishnie, supra note 61, at 213.
71
Amy Lagenfeld, Living in Limbo: Mandatory Detention of Immigrants Under the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1041 (1999).
72
Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
73
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (2006).
74
Nina Bernstein, Immigration Detention System Lapses Detailed, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2009, at A25.
75
Suzanne Gamboa, ICE Non-Criminal Detentions Fell for Three Months, ABC NEWS,
Feb. 12, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/politics/wireStory?id=9823216.
76
Id.
77
THE AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.J., BEHIND BARS, THE FAILURE OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY TO ENSURE ADEQUATE TREATMENT OF
69
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Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) provided some
detention facilities for immigrants, the need for space was so great
that non-INS correctional facilities also became immigrant-detention
79
sites. As of 2008, there were 33,000 immigrant detainees in the U.S.
on any given day, approximately half of whom were housed in federal
80
facilities.
Despite the congressional mandate to place these individuals in
detention, and its over-expansive effects, minimal federal regulations
81
govern detention conditions. For example, while the law requires
immigrant detainees in non-INS correctional facilities to be housed
82
separately, they are often housed with criminal inmates.
Furthermore, while conditions in non-INS facilities vary, poor
83
treatment is common; immigrant detainees notoriously endure
84
medical neglect and are rarely, if ever, allowed outdoors. Often the
amount of time that an individual is left in detention is egregious
85
unto itself. Only about ten percent have an attorney because free
86
legal representation is not guaranteed to immigrant detainees.
Communication with family is limited and transfers to other facilities
87
often occur without notice. Furthermore, transfers occur when it
would be more logical to keep the detainee in one place; detainees
IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN NEW JERSEY 2 (2007) [hereinafter AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION].
78
The INS was formerly part of the Department of Justice. History: Who Became
Part of the Department?, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/
xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010). It ceased to exist in
2003, and its functions were delegated to ICE, Customs and Border Protection, and
Citizen and Immigration Services within Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
See id.
79
Lagenfeld, supra note 71, at 1050.
80
Dana Priest & Amy Goldstein, System of Neglect: As Tighter Immigration Policies
Strain Federal Agencies, the Detainees in Their Care Often Pay a Heavy Cost, WASH. POST,
May 11, 2008, at A1.
81
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 77.
82
See generally Lagenfeld, supra note 71, at 1050. Under the law, criminal
incarceration and immigrant detention are separate systems despite the public
tendency to view them as comparable, if not equal; immigration proceedings are
within the civil system while criminal proceedings are not. DR. DORA SCHRIRO,
HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, IMMIGRATION
DETENTION OVERVIEW AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4 (2009). “[I]mmigrant detention is
not punishment.” Id. at 4 n.2 (emphasis added) (citing Zaydvas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678, 609 (2001)).
83
Lagenfeld, supra note 71, at 1050.
84
Priest & Goldstein, supra note 80.
85
Lagenfeld, supra note 71 at 1052.
86
Priest & Goldstein, supra note 80.
87
Lagenfeld, supra note 71, at 1051.
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have been transferred to new facilities despite a high likelihood of
release and when pending prosecutions or warrants exist in the
88
original transferee jurisdiction. Human Rights Watch reported that
1.4 million detainee transfers occurred from 1999 until 2008, the
89
majority of which have occurred since 2006. The frequency with
which detainees are transferred causes inadequate access to legal
counsel and evidence relevant to the detainee’s case, excessive time
in detention, and undue burdens on the detainees themselves as well
90
as their families and legal representatives.
As accountability
measures for non-federal facilities are sparse, immigrant-detention
conditions have remained unacceptable for too long.
The ambit of immigrant detention was meant to target criminal
violators, but civil-immigration violators, immigrants merely seeking
asylum, and even lawfully present immigrants, are consequently
91
subject to criminally punishable treatment. The overextension of
92
this federal scheme is troubling. By delegating immigrant detention
to local authorities, the federal government again decentralized
immigration control. This surge in immigrant detention and the
resulting need for non-federal facilities to house detainees is evidence
of a decentralized system that causes rampant violations of individual
rights.
IV. THE MISCHIEF OF § 287(g)
Much like the IRCA legislation and the mandatory detention
policies of IIRAIRA, the implementation of § 287(g) has had perverse
93
consequences. The program lacks adequate measures to address
94
accountability, implement proper training, and maintain oversight.
As a result, egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment occur with
95
frequency. Additionally, the costs associated with § 287(g) programs
96
are tremendous and cause excessive arrests to run rampant.
Furthermore, § 287(g) causes law-enforcement officers to engage in
racial profiling, which has incited a backlash to the program among
88

Bernstein, supra note 74.
Id.
90
Id.
91
See Lagenfeld, supra note 71, at 1050–51.
92
See id.
93
See generally Chishti, supra note 37.
94
See Stana, supra note 36, at 2–3.
95
See, e.g., In re Pineda Morales, No. A-97-535-404 (E.O.I.R.N.Y., May 13, 2008)
(unpublished opinion on file with author).
96
Chishti, supra note 37, at 6.
89
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local communities and law-enforcement agencies. Section 287(g)
also impedes effective policing because it causes communities to grow
98
wary of cooperating with law enforcement.
Moreover, § 287(g)
99
raises grave constitutional concerns. The mischief that has resulted
from § 287(g) calls for congressional reexamination of the
legislation.
A. Lack of Accountability, Training, and Oversight
Section 287(g) does not contain adequate accountability,
training, or oversight provisions. For example, the statutory language
of § 287(g) does not require procedures to record or review local
100
programs.
Consequently, participating agencies are not
accountable for their actions. No information is available regarding
what aspects of the program participating agencies must record or
101
how ICE must review those agencies’ records. To illustrate, ICE did
not include any instructions or requirements to track or record data
102
in any MOAs that went into effect before 2007.
Starting in 2007,
MOAs began to require participating agencies to track and report
data, but gave no details as to what data the agencies should track
103
and how they should record it. The Government Performance and
Results Act requires law-enforcement agencies to “clearly define their
missions, measure their performance against the goals they have set,
and report on how well they are doing in attaining those goals;” yet
the resulting lack of data inhibits an accurate evaluation of the
104
program.
One consequence of inadequate accountability measures in §
105
287(g) programs is an equal dearth of detailed arrest statistics.
There is no data available regarding what percentage of § 287(g)
106
arrests are for criminal activity as opposed to unlawful presence,

97

Stana, supra note 36, at 7.
Chishti, supra note 37, at 7–8.
99
See discussion infra Part IV.E.
100
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
101
Stana, supra note 36, at 6; Chishti, supra note 37, at 8–9.
102
Stana, supra note 36, at 5.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 5–6 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-96-118,
COMPTROLLER GEN. OF THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE GUIDE: EFFECTIVELY
IMPLEMENTING THE GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE AND RESULTS ACT (1996)).
105
Chishti, supra note 37, at 5.
106
See id.
98
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107

which is not a criminal violation.
Further, ICE does not set forth
“priority categories” in the MOAs, and the statistics merely indicate
that § 287(g) “has departed from the earlier risk-based approach to
immigration enforcement articulated by the Department of
108
Homeland Security.” Nothing beyond the numbers of arrests made
109
is available to reveal how the program is functioning.
ICE should
require participating localities to provide arrest statistics to assess
general progress of the programs and to determine if officers are
making proper arrests within the intended purposes of § 287(g).
Moreover, ICE does not provide § 287(g) agencies or officers
110
with adequate immigration training.
Whereas ICE agents receive
five months of immigration-enforcement training, § 287(g) officers
111
To compound this deficiency, local officers
receive four weeks.
have other law-enforcement responsibilities in addition to
immigration enforcement. Thus, it takes longer for local officers to
accumulate experience in immigration enforcement than it does for
an ICE officer. Because of the complex and unique nature of
immigration law, the International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP), which consists of 20,000 police executives from nearly ninety
112
countries, has warned that § 287(g) programs may cause more
113
Fourth Amendment violations.
ICE states that “[t]he MOA defines the scope and limitations of
the authority to be designated [and] . . . establishes the supervisory
114
structure for the officers working under the cross-designation.” ICE
also maintains that it will supervise all participating agencies when

107
See CARLINER et al., supra note 33, at 166 (noting that “[s]imply being in the
United States is not a crime”).
108
Chishti, supra note 37, at 5.
109
See id.
110
See Stana, supra note 36, at 3.
111
Id.; Chishti, supra note 37, at 7.
112
About
IACP,
INT’L
ASS’N
OF
CHIEFS
OF
POLICE,
http://theiacp.org/About/tabid/57/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 16, 2010); About
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/about/index.htm (last visited Apr. 16, 2010).
113
Police Chiefs Guide to Immigration Issues, INT’L ASS’N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, July
2007, at 13, available at http://www.theiacp.org/Portals/0/pdfs/Publications/
PoliceChiefsGuidetoImmigration.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
CHIEFS OF POLICE]; see CARLINER et al., supra note 33, at 123 (“Once aliens have
entered the U.S., they are covered by the [F]ourth [A]mendment’s protection
against unlawful searches and seizures.”).
114
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act,
U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/287g/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2010).
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115

acting in their § 287(g) capacities. But ICE has failed to provide §
116
287(g) agencies with adequate direction or supervision.
Section
287(g) mandates that all details pertaining to powers, duties,
duration of authority, supervision, and direction “shall be set forth in
a written agreement between the Attorney General and the State or
117
political subdivision.”
Beyond this general grant of authority,
however, there is no directive of how and when the agencies should
118
Additionally, there is no statement of
exercise their authority.
program objectives other than to enforce the law against immigration
119
violations.
Consequently, “some participating agencies are using
their 287(g) authority to process for removal aliens who have
committed minor offenses, such as speeding, carrying an open
120
container of alcohol, and urinating in public.”
But none of these
violations constitute serious criminal conduct that Congress intended
121
the statute to combat.
Additionally, participating agencies must
incorporate a complaint process into their immigration-enforcement
schemes, thus allowing individuals who believe the program has
122
wronged them to address their grievances.
Because of unclear
guidelines and the conflict of interest entailed in processing a
complaint, this provision has been ineffective in many participating
123
localities.
The vagueness of the statute and MOAs permits agencies to
employ the program as they see fit without considering broader
124
national objectives. Although ICE officials have stated that § 287(g)
is meant to combat serious criminal immigrant activity, there is no
documentation of such an objective in materials that participating
125
agencies receive. Further, while there is no explicit grant of power
for local law-enforcement agencies to regulate civil-immigration
115

Id.
See Stana, supra note 36, at 3–4.
117
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(5) (2006).
118
Stana, supra note 36, at 3–4; see also § 1357(g).
119
Stana, supra note 36, at 3.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N.C. LEGAL FOUND., IMMIGRATION & HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICY CLINIC, UNIV. OF N.C. AT CHAPEL HILL, THE POLICIES AND POLITICS OF
LOCAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT LAWS: 287(G) PROGRAM IN NORTH CAROLINA, Feb.
2009, at 3–4, available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/clinicalprograms/
287gexecutivesummary.pdf.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
Id
116
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violations, there is no prohibitive language either.
This ambiguity
127
has produced grave unintended consequences.
Rather than
reacting to suspected violent criminals, local authorities have begun
instead to initiate hostile interactions with individuals on the
suspicion that they may be illegal immigrants.
The statute also requires the Attorney General to supervise all
128
participating agencies.
Yet there is no available information
129
regarding these supervisory requirements.
Again, this lack of
specificity inevitably leads to “wide variation in the perception of the
nature and extent of supervisory responsibility among ICE field
130
officials and officials from . . . participating agencies,” which in turn
leads to unclear program objectives and disparate implementation of
131
the program.
126

Id.
Id.
128
8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2006).
129
Stana, supra note 36, at 4.
130
Id.
131
Id. Recent § 287(g) agreements, however, have attempted to resolve this issue.
See, e.g., FOIA Reading Room, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/foia/readingroom.htm (follow 287(g) - Memorandums of
Agreement/Understanding hyperlink, then follow NEW JERSEY | Hudson County
Department of Corrections | Jail and Task Force | 10/15/2009 hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 24, 2010). In New Jersey, the Hudson County Department of Corrections
recently entered into an MOA with ICE that details with some specificity the level of
supervision required. Id. It states
Immigration enforcement activities conducted by the participating
HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS personnel
will be supervised and directed by ICE supervisory officers or
designated ICE team leaders. Participating HUDSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS personnel are not authorized to
perform immigration officer functions except when working under the
supervision or guidance of ICE. . . .
Participating HUDSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
personnel shall give timely notice to ICE supervisory officials within 24
hours of any detainer issued under the authorities set forth in this
MOA.
The actions of participating HUDSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS personnel will be reviewed by ICE
supervisory officers on an ongoing basis to ensure compliance with the
requirements of the immigration laws and procedures and to assess the
need for individual training or guidance. . . .
In the absence of a written agreement to the contrary, the policies and
procedures to be utilized by the participating HUDSON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS personnel in exercising these
authorities shall be DHS and ICE policies and procedures . . . .
Id. at 7. It is further worth noting that the Hudson County MOA is an agreement
between ICE and the county’s Department of Corrections, not the county police
department. Id. The Department of Corrections serves a more ministerial capacity
under its § 287(g) authority than many state and local police departments; suspected
127

LITWIN_FORMATTED_FINAL_1.25.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

414

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

2/9/2011 8:26 AM

[Vol. 41:399

As a result of inadequate training, accountability, and oversight
measures in the § 287(g) program, warrantless entry into the home
has become a major source of egregious Fourth Amendment
132
violations in recent immigration enforcement.
The Fourth
Amendment and subsequent case law establish high levels of
133
protection over privacy of the home.
The Supreme Court has
declared that “physical entry of a home is the chief evil against which
134
the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed.”
A Fourth
Amendment violation is presumed to occur if officers enter or search
a home without consent from an adult resident of the home, a
judicial warrant from an impartial magistrate judge, or exigent
135
circumstances.
Thus, warrantless entry—no matter if probable
cause is present or not—constitutes a Fourth Amendment violation in
136
the context of both criminal and civil-immigration enforcement.
Despite constitutional requirements, numerous stories have surfaced
that agents are unlawfully entering the homes of suspected
137
immigrants.
138
In re Pineda Morales is one such story. This case involved only
ICE agents because no § 287(g) MOA existed in the relevant
139
locality.
In April 2007, New York City Fugitive Operations Unit
immigration violators are already in custody when the Department of Corrections
may exercise its authority, and its principal role is to process them. Thus, many
concerns that this Comment addresses are not present in an MOA between ICE and
a state or local department of corrections, as opposed to a state or local police
department.
132
See, e.g., In re Pineda Morales, No. A-97-535-404, at *1 (E.O.I.R.N.Y., May 13,
2008) (unpublished opinion on file with author) (holding that evidence procured
from a warrantless entry constituted a Fourth Amendment violation).
133
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
134
United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 312 (1972).
135
BESS CHIU, LYNLY EGYES, PETER L. MARKOWITZ & JAYA VASANDANI, CARDOZO
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC, CONSTITUTION ON ICE: A REPORT ON IMMIGRATION HOME
RAIDS 6 (2009). Whereas outside the home, probable cause is sufficient to make an
arrest—even without a warrant—a higher standard is required to enter the home. Id.
136
Id. In fact, ICE agents are required to gain informed consent from occupants,
as they are not issued warrants from impartial magistrates, before making entry into a
dwelling. Id. ICE officers are trained—and required—to “knock-and-talk” before
entering a home, and only upon obtaining consent from an occupant may ICE
agents enter the home. Id.
137
See Pineda Morales, No. A-97-535-404 at *1–3; see also CTR. FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE,
SETON HALL UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, KNOW YOUR RIGHTS: HOW TO PREPARE FOR AN
IMMIGRATION RAID OR ENCOUNTER WITH IMMIGRATION AGENTS OR POLICE IN NEW JERSEY
1 (2009).
138
See Pineda Morales, No. A-97-535-404 at *1–3.
139
See Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and
IMMIGRATION
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
Nationality
Act,
U.S.
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entered a home at approximately 3:00 in the morning. The officers
arrested Respondent Pineda Morales and took him for processing at
141
a Department of Homeland Security location.
He had given
identification documents to the arresting officials before they
brought him in for processing. Despite alleged requests to speak with
an attorney, officers interrogated Pineda Morales and placed him in a
142
holding cell.
Based on the documents he relinquished, ICE was
able to establish the respondent’s birthplace as Guatemala, thus
143
The court stated “there is no dispute that it
proving his alienage.
was as a result of the Government’s obtaining the passport and
driver’s license of the respondent that it was able to obtain this
144
‘independent piece of evidence.’”
Pineda Morales moved to suppress this evidence and terminate
145
In reaching the conclusion that the officers were
the proceeding.
able to procure all evidence against Pineda Morales as the result of a
home invasion that violated the Fourth Amendment, the court stated
that:
INA Section 287(a) sets forth the power of Immigration officers
and employees without a warrant. None of these powers includes
entering a home without a warrant. . . .
I think the Fourth Amendment is clear in this country that in
order to enter sanctified area of one’s home the police need a
warrant. . . . I suppress [the evidence] because I find that . . . all
evidence the Government seized about the individual before me,
Victor Leonel Pineda Morales, was improperly seized as an
146
egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Because the officers did not have a warrant and did not obtain
consent to enter the home, the court held that Pineda Morales’s
147
Fourth Amendment rights had been violated.
Pineda Morales
illustrates that although ICE mandates strict procedures and
extensive training to its agents, egregious violations nonetheless
148
occur. Section 287(g) procedures set forth in MOAs are vague and
http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2010)
(listing all states and localities that participate in 287(g)).
140
Pineda Morales, No. A-97-535-404 at *1–2.
141
Id. at *2.
142
Id.
143
Id. at *2–3.
144
Id. at *3.
145
Id. at *1.
146
Pineda Morales, No. A-97-535-404 at *6–7, *9–10.
147
Id. at *9.
148
Chiu et. al., supra note 135, at 8.
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boilerplate, and participating agents are given minimal training in
149
comparison to ICE agents.
In light of egregious violations caused
by ICE officers themselves, we can only expect more numerous
violations to occur as a result of state and local enforcement of
immigration law under § 287(g).
B. Cost
The costs associated with § 287(g) are excessive and
unnecessary, and ICE financially motivates states and localities to
make as many arrests as possible under the § 287(g) program. The
Frederick County Sherriff’s Office of Maryland, for instance, entered
into a § 287(g) MOA that guaranteed the county a reimbursement of
eighty-three dollars per day for detaining an immigrant, which,
150
according to Frederick officials, costs only seven dollars per day.
Excessive arrests are an inherent risk and a likely product of such an
agreement.
Furthermore, the overall cost of the § 287(g) program is
enormous.
DHS officials have stated that the first year of
151
implementation of an MOA costs approximately $17.5 million. The
sixty-seven current MOAs have expended a total of $1 billion in the
152
first year of each program.
Expenditures come from the federal,
state, and local levels; from 2006 through 2008, ICE provided $60
million in training and resources to participating agencies, while
153
localities provided for various expenses that ICE did not reimburse.
Such over-enforcement is unsustainable; the expanding use of §
287(g) has overwhelmed ICE and its resources. The more that local
police discover civil-immigration violators, the more inundated ICE
154
becomes.
The sheriff of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina
reported that his county’s MOA had authorized agents to identify
155
This, in turn, took a large toll on the
civil-immigration violators.
149

See Stana, supra note 36, at 3–4.
Chishti, supra note 37, at 6 (citing Nicholas C. Stern, Sherriff Updates County on
ICE Action, FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Oct. 17, 2008, at 1).
151
Chishti, supra note 37, at 7.
152
Id. at 7.
153
Stana, supra note 36, at 6.
154
Chishti, supra note 37, at 4.
155
Id. (citing Empowering Local Law Enforcement to Combat Illegal Immigration,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources of the
H. Comm. On Gov’t Reform, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Jim Pendergraph,
Sheriff of Mecklenburg County, North Carolina); see also Stana, supra note 36, at 4
(“[A] potential consequence of not having documented program objectives is misuse
of authority.”).
150
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ICE facility to which his agents reported civil-immigration violators.
Seven other North Carolina counties have since entered into MOAs
with ICE that mirror the language used in Mecklenburg County’s
MOA, and sixteen more agreements are pending in the state as of
157
2009.
In fact, nearly every MOA nationwide is based on the same
158
template.
Thus, over-enforcement widely diverts resources from
the program’s original objective—to target dangerous criminal
immigrants.
That participating agencies are burdening ICE facilities to an
unmanageable extreme indicates that § 287(g) is overly utilized. If
all participating agencies made as many arrests as the Mecklenberg
County police force did, ICE’s strategic plan—to use all available
detention facilities “for those aliens that pose the greatest threat to
159
the public” —would be compromised.
C. Racial Profiling
Section 287(g) promotes racial profiling—“the law enforcement
technique of singling out a person for a stop, interrogation, arrest, or
160
other investigation because of race or ethnic appearance” —by
encouraging state and local law-enforcement officers to screen
161
individuals based on physical appearance. While using race as part
of a specific suspect’s description is permissible, predicting that
members of a certain group are more likely to commit a crime is
162
not.
Many communities are wary to encourage such behavior by
their local police, hence Utah’s decision not to enter into an MOA in
163
1998. Furthermore, over fifty percent of participating agencies that
164
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) interviewed reported
156

Chishti, supra note 37, at 4.
Id.
158
Id. at 6.
159
Stana, supra note 36, at 3.
160
Carrie L. Arnold, Note, Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement: State and
Local Agreements to Enforce Federal Law, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 113, 116–17 (2007).
161
Id. at 123.
162
Id. at 117.
163
Chishti, supra note 37, at 8. Section 287(g) additionally leads to the promotion
of negative stereotypes. Id. The difference between immigrants who are unlawfully
present in the country and those who are convicted of serious crimes is easily blurred
when both are equally punishable under § 287(g)’s vague guidelines. Id. This is a
questionable message to send to the public. Id.
164
The GAO is the audit, evaluation, and investigative agency of Congress. Stana,
supra note 36, at 10. It assists Congress to achieve its constitutional obligations by
improving accountability and performance of the federal government and its
agencies. Id.
157
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that community members’ concerns about § 287(g) focused on racial
165
profiling. Such police conduct invariably leads to tension between
immigrant communities and local law enforcement agencies.
The case of Melendres v. Arpaio exemplifies how § 287(g)
166
generates a system of racial profiling.
Arpaio consisted of several
claims against Joseph M. Arpaio, Sheriff of Maricopa County,
Arizona, for profiling, targeting, stopping, and detaining persons
167
based on race. The plaintiffs alleged that police officers, pursuant
168
to their § 287(g) powers, were violating the Fourth Amendment.
First, officers pulled over a vehicle in which Manuel de Jesus Ortega
Melendres was a passenger. He presented them with a valid U.S. visa,
but the officers subjected him to a pat down, handcuffed him, and
169
detained him in a holding cell. In addition, on a separate occasion,
police pulled over David and Jessica Rodriguez along with several
other vehicles, yet they were the only motorists asked to produce
documentation—including a social security card—while other
170
motorists were allowed to pass. Lastly, police officers yelled at Velia
Meraz and Manuel Nieto, Jr., both U.S. citizens, to leave a gas station
for “disturbing the peace” when they were singing to music in their
171
car. Police followed Meraz and Nieto as they left, pulled them over
in Nieto’s family business’s parking lot, pulled Nieto out of the car,
172
and violently handcuffed him.
The court conceded that ICE, state, and local law-enforcement
agents have an unquestionable right to investigate and potentially
arrest individuals unlawfully present in the country, but that officers’
173
actions are “always circumscribed by the Fourth Amendment.”
In
denying Sheriff Arpaio’s motion to dismiss, the court stated that race
174
alone is not an adequate reason to assess reasonable suspicion.
Further, it quoted the Ninth Circuit in declaring that “‘Hispanic
appearance is of little or no use in determining which particular

165

Id.
598 F. Supp. 2d 1025 (9th Cir. 2009).
167
Id. at 1033 (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129–
30 (9th Cir. 2000)).
168
Id. at 1029.
169
Id. at 1030.
170
Id. at 1031.
171
Id.
172
Arpaio, 598 F. Supp. 2d at 1030–32.
173
Id. at 1033 (citing United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87
(1975)).
174
Id. at 1033–34.
166
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individuals among the vast Hispanic populace should be stopped by
175
law enforcement officials on the lookout for illegal aliens.’” Thus,
law enforcement officers must make “permissible deductions” based
on objective, logical evidence regarding criminal activity rather than
use race or appearance as the predominant reason for
176
investigation. Arpaio illustrates the problems that have arisen from
increasing the number of officers entitled to interrogate individuals
on their immigration status—and by not affording those officers
adequate training, direction, or supervision. Racial profiling is thus a
severe consequence of § 287(g) that produces egregious Fourth
Amendment violations.
D. Community Distrust in Police
Section 287(g) causes community distrust in police and hinders
effective policing. In the absence of a § 287(g) MOA, lawenforcement officers may contact ICE to obtain information on the
immigration status of immigrants suspected of crimes as well as those
177
who have been arrested or convicted. But state and local agencies
are able to interrogate directly criminal suspects, arrestees, or
178
convicts when delegated the § 287(g) power.
All local law-enforcement agencies depend on cooperation from
local communities to effectively protect public health, safety, and
179
welfare.
Section 287(g) compromises this mission because
immigrant communities consequently become hesitant to
180
communicate and cooperate with police. IACP officials believe that
local law-enforcement of immigration has a “chilling effect on both
legal and illegal aliens reporting criminal activity or assisting police in
criminal investigations . . . [and] diminish[es] the ability of law
enforcement agencies to effectively police their communities and
181
protect the public they serve.”

175
Id. at 1034 (quoting United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129
(9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).
176
Id. at 1034 (quoting United States v. Berber-Tinoco, 510 F.3d 1083, 1088 (9th
Cir. 2007)).
177
Stana, supra note 36, at 4 n.6.
178
Id.
179
See INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, supra note 113, at 13.
180
Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1095 (2004).
181
Chishti, supra note 37, at 8.
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There are dangerous consequences if communities do not trust
182
If immigrants are less
their local law enforcement agencies.
trusting of local police, they will be less likely to report when they are
183
victims of crime and will thus become more vulnerable. The same
is true for victims of domestic violence and witnesses of crime and
184
violence. Allowing all residents to feel safe in coming forward and
cooperating with police is essential to the maintenance of community
185
safety.
Furthermore, the police forces of major American cities—
including New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Denver, and
186
Chicago—all oppose implementing § 287(g) programs.
Police
chiefs in those cities believe that to maintain effective partnerships
with their communities, officers cannot be charged with detaining or
187
arresting individuals solely on immigration grounds. “[I]t would be
virtually impossible to [combat crime] effectively if witnesses and
victims, no matter what their residency status, had some reluctance to
188
come forward for fear of being deported.”
Lima and Milgrim’s directive further illustrate how state and
local immigration enforcement fosters community distrust in
189
police. Milgrim’s directive reads:
State, county, and local law enforcement agencies necessarily and
appropriately should inquire about a person’s immigration status
under certain circumstances. Specifically, after an individual has
been arrested for a serious violation of State criminal law, the
individual’s immigration status is relevant to his or her ties to the
community, the likelihood that he or she will appear at a future
court proceeding to answer State or local charges, and the
interest of the federal government in considering immigration
enforcement proceedings. . . . When there is reason to believe
that the arrestee may be an undocumented immigrant, the

182

Id.
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
McKenzie, supra note 34, at 1160.
187
Id. (quoting Nat’l Immigration Forum, From Community Policing to Community
Profiling: The Justice Department’s Proposal to Have Local Police Enforce Immigration Laws,
IMMIGRATION FORUM, May 28, 2002).
188
Id.
189
See Complaint, Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t., No. 08-0426 (D.N.J. Jan. 23,
2008); ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 2.
183
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arresting agency is responsible for alerting federal immigration
190
officials . . . .

The Directive specifically addresses local law-enforcement agencies
that participate in the § 287(g) program apart from those that do
not. It states that § 287(g) officers “may not exercise federal law
enforcement authority [on immigration matters] unless and until the
officer has arrested an individual for violation of an indictable
191
offense, or for driving while intoxicated under state law.”
It then
provides detailed protocol for recording data and to whom it should
be reported. Thus, the New Jersey Directive purports to require
recordkeeping and transparency, neither of which § 287(g) requires
of participating agencies. But even with accountability measures in
place, the Lima case illustrates that even more structure is required to
prevent violations of the Directive from occurring.
The Lima case further demonstrates that the Directive’s express
language is not effective, as less than one month after Milgrim
192
declared the State’s position, the events in question occurred.
Despite clear instructions of when and when not to interrogate for
immigration purposes, officers still violated the Directive—in this
193
case, the Police Chief of Newark. Remarkably, § 287(g) MOAs are
even less decipherable than Milgrim’s directive.
E. The Unconstitutionality of Decentralized Immigration Law
Section 287(g) raises constitutional concerns. The Supremacy
Clause in Article IV of the U.S. Constitution states that the
Constitution, and any law or treaty made pursuant to it, are “the
194
supreme law of the land.”
If a conflict arises between state and
195
Even if
federal law, the federal law thus invalidates the state law.
preemption is not expressly stated, where there is a “clear
congressional intent that federal law should exclusively occupy a
196
field,” then “field” preemption exists.
The Supreme Court has
stated that if no express preemptive language exists, preemption may
still “be found from a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive as to

190

ATTORNEY GENERAL DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
Id. at 5.
192
Complaint, Lima v. Newark Police Dep’t., No. 08-0426 (D.N.J. Jan. 23, 2008).
193
See id.
194
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 392 (3d ed.
2006).
195
Id.
196
Id. at 401–02.
191
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make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the
197
States to supplement it.”
The Supreme Court has stated that the “power to regulate
immigration is unquestionably exclusively a federal power,” is
198
“incapable of transfer,” and “cannot be granted away.”
The
enforcement of immigration law also has been traditionally exclusive
to the federal domain, and the DOJ long recognized—before the
implementation of § 287(g)—that state and local law-enforcement
199
agencies had no authority over immigration enforcement.
Thus,
according to the preemption doctrine, any efforts of states to regulate
immigration are preempted.
Furthermore, the nondelegation doctrine stands for the
200
principle that Congress may not grant away the legislative power.
The Supreme Court has stated that “Congress is not permitted to
abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative function with
201
which it is thus vested.”
The manner in which § 287(g) delegates
enforcement power to states and localities is an example. Although §
287(g) claims to give participating states and localities the authority
to strictly enforce immigration law, the lack of specificity in MOAs
allows states and localities to self-regulate immigration. Thus, §
287(g) in its current state violates the doctrines of both federal
preemption and nondelegation.
Recent litigation in Arizona supports the proposition that §
202
287(g) permits unconstitutional state regulation of immigration. In
197

Id. (citing Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976). In De Canas, however, the
Supreme Court found that there was no federal preemption of a California law that
barred illegal immigrant labor if such employment would negatively affect resident
laborers. Id.; see also Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).
199
Wishnie, supra note 180, at 1090. After the inception of 287(g), however, the
DOJ asserted that states and localities possess the “inherent authority” to enforce
federal criminal and civil immigration laws. Id. (quoting Cheryl W. Thompson, INS
Role for Police Considered; U.S. Eyes State, Local Help in Enforcing Immigration Laws, WASH.
POST, Apr. 4, 2002, at A15). Wishnie points out that congressional grants of
immigration enforcement authority to state and local governments in the INA prove
that the federal government preempts states and localities in this respect; if states
and localities could inherently enforce immigration, the language in the INA would
be redundant. Id. at 1095. He also contends that to argue that states possess the
“inherent authority” to enforce federal immigration law contradicts “well-settled
canons of statutory interpretation,” the legislative history of the INA, and the
understanding, since 1875, that immigration is exclusively a federal power. Id.
200
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 194, at 327–28.
201
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935).
202
See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980, 985 (D. Ariz. July 28, 2010)
(order granting preliminary injunction).
198
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United States v. Arizona, the federal government challenged an Arizona
law, Senate Bill 1070 or the “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe
Neighborhoods Act” (S.B. 1070), which created new state regulations
203
governing immigration-law enforcement. The federal government
argued that certain aspects of S.B. 1070 were preempted by federal
204
Regarding the
immigration law and thus unconstitutional.
provisions of the Arizona law that sought to regulate immigrationstatus determinations, the United States stated that preemption
occurs when a state law “impose[s] a burden on a federal agency’s
205
resources that impede[s] the agency’s function.”
The District
Court agreed that such state regulation of immigration enforcement
would “impermissibly burden federal resources and redirect federal
206
agencies away from the priorities they have established.”
The United States also argued that S.B. 1070 “imposes
substantial burdens on lawful immigrants in a way that frustrates the
concerns of Congress for nationally-uniform rules governing the
treatment of aliens . . . [that are] designed to ensure ‘our traditional
207
policy of not treating aliens as a thing apart.’”
In Hines v.
Davidowitz, the Court first declared that immigration regulation must
protect the rights of legal and law-abiding aliens and ensure their
208
freedom from “inquisitorial practices and police surveillance.” The
District Court agreed with the federal government that the provisions
of S.B. 1070 attempting to regulate immigration status checks
violated Hines and restricted the liberties of lawful aliens, particularly
due to the increase in status determinations that S.B. 1070 sought to
209
implement.
The findings of the District Court for the District of Arizona in
issuing an injunction against several provisions of S.B. 1070 discredits
§ 287(g) and leads to the conclusion that it, also, is unconstitutional
as impermissible state regulation of the exclusively federal domain.
Although § 287(g) appears in the form of a federal law solely
enforced at the state level, it actually creates a state-by-state system of

203

See id.
Id. at 986.
205
Id. at 995.
206
Id. at 996.
207
Id. at 994 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 53, 73 (1941)).
208
312 U.S. 53, 74 (1941).
209
See United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d at 994. Specifically, S.B. 1070
attempts to require immigration status determinations during lawful stops,
detentions, and arrests where the officer on the scene has a reasonable suspicion that
the individual is an illegal alien. Id. at 996.
204
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immigration regulation. Like S.B. 1070, § 287(g) imposes substantial
burdens on legal aliens and impedes the mission of ICE to
apprehend dangerous criminal immigrants. The recent District
Court injunction against Arizona’s S.B. 1070 affirms the invalidity of §
287(g).
V. A CALL TO CONGRESS TO REPEAL § 287(g) OR TO HEAVILY
RESTRICT ITS AMBIT
The initiation of state and local law-enforcement of immigration
through the § 287(g) program has furthered a decentralized system.
Various trends in immigration enforcement demonstrate that local
involvement gives rise to egregious violations of the Fourth
Amendment. To protect the rights of immigrants and racial
minorities who may be mistaken for immigrants, Congress must
repeal § 287(g) and re-centralize the enforcement of immigration.
Immigration enforcement priorities must be set at the federal
level. Only from a national perspective can all of the relevant
factors and resource levels be taken into account. This permits a
much more efficient allocation of resources on a system-wide basis
and avoids expending a great deal of federal resources on
individuals who pose neither a threat to public safety nor national
210
security.

While ICE has proven that it, too, is capable of egregious Fourth
Amendment violations, eliminating localized enforcement will cause
the frequency of such violations to drop immensely. Furthermore,
local police will be able to work more effectively with the trust of
minority and immigrant communities who are made more vulnerable
by § 287(g).
Alternatively, Congress must, at the very least, heavily restrict the
ambit of § 287(g). If § 287(g) programs continue, Congress must
require ICE to take various steps that would regulate the nature of §
287(g) programs. This Comment raises concerns with five aspects of
§ 287(g)—lack of accountability, training, and oversight; cost; racial
profiling; community distrust in police; and unconstitutionality.
Congress must address each of these matters in restricting the ambit
of § 287(g).
First, ICE must ensure that MOAs provide specific direction to
state and local law-enforcement agencies. Specifically, the MOAs
must mandate that state and local agencies are to seek apprehension
only of criminal-immigration violators who pose a threat to national

210

Wishnie, supra note 180, at 1095.
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security or public safety. In order to effectively achieve that goal, ICE
must properly and adequately train state and local agents, maintain
proper oversight, and implement accountability measures. For
instance, ICE must require state and local police forces to keep
detailed records of their arrests.
ICE must further evaluate
participating agencies and their data on a regular basis to assess the
progress of localized-immigration programs and to ensure
compliance with the details of the MOAs. Such measures would allow
for stricter regulation of state and participating agencies and would
prevent egregious Fourth Amendment violations, such as warrantless
entry into the home.
Additionally, ICE must seek to reduce the cost of § 287(g)
programs. Most crucially, ICE must no longer financially incentivize
participating agencies to make arrests. Aside from increasing the
costs associated with § 287(g), promoting excessive arrests leads to
egregious Fourth Amendment violations and promotes community
distrust in law enforcement. If ICE mandates that participating
agencies are only to target high-risk criminal immigrants, not only
will the cost of the program drop, but it will also become a more
effective means to achieve program objectives.
ICE must furthermore ensure that participating lawenforcement agencies do not continue to racially profile. Rather
than targeting individuals who may appear to be immigrants based
on their race, § 287(g) officers should be trained to focus on criminal
suspects and to target those high-risk individuals only. Racial
profiling hinders the principal objectives of § 287(g) by diverting
resources from criminals who pose threats to national security and
public safety. Moreover, it causes community distrust in police and
creates an adversarial system in which individuals fear cooperating
with law-enforcement agents.
Congress must require ICE to take precautions in drafting §
287(g) agreements that will enable law-enforcement agencies to
effectively police. The creation of accountability measures, more
specified training, and more detailed oversight; the reduction in cost
and elimination of financial incentives to make arrests; and a noracial profiling policy would all create a § 287(g) system in which
communities would be more likely to cooperate with police.
Furthermore, placing stronger regulation on § 287(g) programs
would bring the legislation into compliance with the U.S.
Constitution. No longer would the federal government delegate away
so much enforcement authority that causes § 287(g) programs to rise
to the level of impermissible state regulation. Rather, the § 287(g)
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program could function as a valid exercise of the federal
government’s delegation power, and it would cease to violate the
doctrine of non-delegable duties.
While undocumented immigration is most certainly a problem
unto itself and in need of substantial reform, it does not justify
unregulated and unconstitutional conduct that not only broadly
targets undocumented immigrants, but also reaches well beyond the
undocumented population. If Congress does not force ICE to
change its approach to state and local enforcement of immigration,
egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment are sure to continue.
In light of the number and nature of egregious violations that
continue to occur in immigration-law enforcement, major legislative
reform is necessary.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since 1986, decentralization has pervaded immigration
enforcement, most recently through § 287(g) of the INA. Earlier
measures to decentralize enforcement—including employer
verification programs and privatized immigrant-detention facilities—
proved problematic. Section 287(g) has again demonstrated that
decentralizing immigration enforcement leads to quite troubling
results. Specifically, giving state and local law-enforcement agencies
the authority to enforce immigration law leads to egregious violations
of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the legislation and
regulations are so vaguely crafted that the program has gone far
adrift from its intended purpose—to target unlawfully present
criminals—and has become a generalized and unregulated
immigration-enforcement tool. Consequently, racial profiling and
community distrust in local police have gravely increased. Congress
must repeal § 287(g) or heavily restrict its ambit in order to remedy
the constitutional violations and grave policy concerns that the
program continues to promote.

